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ABSTRACT

The recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Bostock v. Clayton County is
a landmark piece of case law that offers fundamental rights to LGBT
persons. This essay reflects on how this case arrived at the Supreme
Court and its implications for theory and praxis. The overall conclusion is that cautious optimism is warranted.
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The progression of LGBTQþ1 (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and more)
rights in the United States has been a long and winding road, with many bumps along
the way. From the progress seen in repealing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and instituting
marriage equity, to the ongoing challenges from individuals whose values do not comport with LGBTQ þ equal treatment (e.g., public restroom debates, individual business
owners refusing same-sex wedding cakes, and bureaucrats refusing same-sex marriage
licenses), the evolving nature of LGBTQþ protections is complicated. Employment
rights for LGBTQ þ individuals are just now beginning to align with LGBTQ þ civil
rights gains, largely due to the United States Supreme Court case issued on June 15,
2020. The landmark ruling, Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. ____ (2020), held that
Title VII’s prohibition of sex-based discrimination applies to lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender (LGBT) individuals in the workplace. Below we provide an overview of the
foundational protections and legal precedent leading to Bostock. Then, we review the
case details and rationale put forth in Bostock’s majority opinion. Finally, we posit how
this ruling will impact public administration theory and practice, particularly for human
resources management within public workplaces.

Paving the way for Bostock
Federal government policy and case law dating back to the 1950s inform Bostock.
The difficult history of LGBT employees involves discriminatory practices beginning in
the 1950s known as “the Lavender Scare,” where stereotyping and stigmatization gay
and lesbian employees as public safety threats led to nearly 600 federal employees were
fired as a result of their sexual orientation (Federman & Elias 2017). Then, in 1978, the
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Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) was passed, defining prohibited personnel practices,
including prohibiting discrimination against federal employees for conduct not directly
related to job duties (CSRA, 1978); however, it was not until 1980 that the U.S. Office
of Personnel Management found that this applied to sexual orientation, and that an
individual who believed he or she was discriminated against based on his or her sexual
orientation could file a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC; Hicks,
2014, cited in Elias, 2017).
The most significant legislative protection for LGBTQ þ individuals in the United
States is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Public Law 88-352, 78 Stat. 241),
where individuals are protected from discrimination based on sex, race, color, national
origin, and religion (Guy & Fenley 2013 cited in Elias, 2020). Yet, prior to Bostock the
interpretation of “sex” under Title VII was a gray area for both sexual orientation and
gender identity, with lower courts offering competing interpretations of “sex” under
Title VII. In Bostock, the Court offers three key points of clarity from previous caselaw
and Title VII: first, making clear the application of “sex” and sex-based discrimination;
second, recognizing sexual orientation as an identity category; and third, strengthening
employment law by affirming EEOC findings.
First, the Bostock ruling depends upon understandings of “sex” and sex-based discrimination. In previous cases, courts have relied on biological definitions of sex.
Historically, courts have examined questions of sex-based discrimination in different
context, such as related to the hiring process of women with children (Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 1971), pension discrimination related to women often living longer than men (Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 1978). Sexual harassment and safe workplaces have particularly been focus areas for courts. For instance, in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986), the Supreme Court of the United States
(SCOTUS) found that under Title VII, sexual harassment constitutes discrimination.
A later ruling in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989) held that gender stereotyping also
constitutes discrimination as per Title VII:
In the landmark case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989), the Supreme Court
determined that Title VII prohibits discrimination because an individual fails to conform
to gender-based expectations. In that case, the Court found that discriminating against
someone because he or she does not meet a traditional, gender-based stereo- type,
including how a woman or man should act, dress, speak, or otherwise behave, is
discrimination based on sex under Title VII. This case developed the “sex-stereotyping”
theory of sex discrimination. Relying on Price Waterhouse, the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“the Commission” or “the EEOC”) has found that
discrimination against an individual because of his or her sexual orientation may state a
claim under Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition because the discrimination is based
on sex stereotypes. (Elias, 2017)

Later, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. (1998), SCOTUS ruled that Title
VII’s protections against workplace discrimination as related to sex are applicable to
same-sex harassment.
Second, Bostock also relies on the growing recognition of and protections for persons
based upon sexual orientation in particular. It is important to remember that for centuries, there was no legal recognition of sexual orientation and gender identity as identities. Rather, in many legal contexts, sexual orientation and gender identity were treated
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as behaviors. For instance, in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), SCOTUS focused on a
Georgia law that classified homosexual sexual relations as illegal sodomy, finding that
there was no constitutional right to engage in homosexual sex. As part of this ruling,
SCOTUS asserted that homosexuality was akin to a behavior, not an identity. Bowers
was overturned in 2003 in Lawrence v. Texas, which held that anti-sodomy laws are
unconstitutional. Later, in United States v. Windsor (2012), SCOTUS overturned Section
3 of the Defense of Marriage Act. DOMA federally defined marriage as between one
man and one woman as husband and wife. Finally, in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015),
SCOTUS ruled that the right to get married is a fundamental right guaranteed to samesex couples as per the due process clause and equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Both the Windsor and Obergefell rulings build
upon past court rulings establishing the right to marry as fundamental to constitutional
protections (Cornell Law School, 2020).
Third, key rulings by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
helped refine understandings of protections afforded to persons based upon transgender
status and sexual orientation. The landmark 2012 ruling in Macy v. Holder held that
discrimination against someone because he or she is transgender, falls under Title VII’s
“sex discrimination.” Since the Commission issued Macy, other federal agencies have
agreed that claims of transgender employment discrimination are claims of sex discrimination. For example, in 2014, the OSC, citing the Commission’s decision in Macy,
found that not allowing a transgender female to use the female restroom after she transitioned was sex discrimination (OSC, 2014, cited in Elias 2017). In a similar ruling in
Baldwin v. Foxx, the EEOC found that discrimination based on sexual orientation is
also prohibited by Title VII.
The EEOC rulings above were further qualified by two directives from the
Department of Justice. In 2014 during the Obama administration, Attorney General
Eric Holder issued a directive ordering the Department of Justice to treat “sex” as also
referring to gender identity, meaning that the protections of Title VII were now
extended to transgender persons. However, in 2017, Jeff Sessions, the Trump administration’s first attorney general, revoked Holder’s directive, noting that “sex” in Title VII
referred solely to biological distinctions between male or female, thus meaning that gender-identity based discrimination was not banned by Title VII (Savage, 2017).
From this historical progression of legislation and case law, the Bostock ruling situates
itself in growing LGBT protections. It also takes a clear stand on the competing executive-level directives on whether “sex” in Title VII also refers to gender identity. Thus,
Bostock emerges as a clear affirmation by the Court of LGBT protections under
Title VII.

Understanding the Bostock ruling
As is the case with several landmark SCOTUS rulings
County was actually an amalgamation of several cases.
Inc. v Zarda, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v.
Commission, and the Bostock case itself due to the cases

in the past, Bostock v. Clayton
These include Altitude Express
Equal Employment Opportunity
being similar in question.
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Gerald Bostock worked in Clayton County, Georgia’s juvenile court system. Since he
started his employment in 2003, Bostock was an employee with good performance
records. In 2013, he joined a gay softball team and promoted it at work, highlighting it
as a volunteer opportunity. During a 2013 work audit, Bostock was fired for conduct
“unbecoming of a public employee” based on misspent funds. Bostock alleged that the
claim of him misspending funds was a pretext for firing him for his sexual orientation.
Bostock sought recourse in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Clayton County representatives sought to dismiss claim, and the District Court agreed,
noting that prior case law held that Title VII did not apply to discrimination based on
sexual orientation. Bostock appealed to the 11th Circuit Court, which in 2018 affirmed
the District Court’s ruling. This 11th Circuit Court ruling presented conflicts in that in
another case, the 7th Circuit found the previous year that discrimination in employment
based upon sexual orientation did violate Title VII (see Hively v. Ivy Tech Community
College of Indiana). Bostock filed a writ of certiorari, petitioning the Court to clarify
whether Title VII covers sexual orientation, and SCOTUS agreed to hear in the case.
The primary finding of Bostock is that an employer violates Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act if this employer fires someone solely for being gay or transgender. In a
6-3 ruling and in a majority opinion authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, SCOTUS ruled
in favor of Bostock. Several important quotations from the syllabus of the majority ruling are presented in Table 1, all of which help situate Bostock in the legal background
discussed above.
In Bostock, two dissents were issued. The first, written by Justice Samuel Alito and
joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, emphasized the intentions of the Congress in 1964
in passing the Civil Rights Act. In his dissent, Alito noted:
Many will applaud today’s decision because they agree on policy grounds with the Court’s
updating of Title VII. But the question in these cases is not whether discrimination
because of sexual orientation or gender identity should be outlawed. The question is
whether Congress did that in 1964. It indisputably did not. (p. 4)

In the second dissent, Justice Brett Kavanaugh emphasized constitutional separation
of powers. He wrote, “[u]nder the Constitution’s separation of powers, the responsibility
to amend Title VII belongs to Congress and the President in the legislative process, not
to this Court” (p. 2). Kavanaugh also argued that sex-based discrimination and sexual
orientation discrimination are distinct: “To fire one employee because she is a woman
and another employee because he is gay implicates two distinct societal concerns,
reveals two distinct biases, imposes two distinct harms, and falls within two distinct
statutory prohibitions” (p. 24).
Taken as a whole, the Bostock ruling has extensive implications for praxis and theory.
The next two sections discuss these dimensions.

Implications for Praxis
Now that Bostock solidifies LGBTQ þ protections in the workplace, the question
becomes how these protections will impact workplace policy and practice. Of central
importance is the organizational environment that fosters the knowledge and training
on legal protections, anti-discrimination approaches, and ethical behavior. One of the
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Table 1. Key quotations from the syllabus of Bostock v. Clayton County.
Majority opinion aim
On the importance of
defining: “Sex,”
“Discriminate,”
and “Individual”

On the employer
firing Bostock

On sex-based rules

On “Sex” as part of
one’s identity

Text from the majority opinion
These terms generate the following rule: An employer violates Title VII when it intentionally
fires an individual employee based in part on sex. It makes no difference if other factors
besides the plaintiff’s sex contributed to the decision or that the employer treated women
as a group the same when compared to men as a group. A statutory violation occurs if an
employer intentionally relies in part on an individual employee’s sex when deciding to
discharge the employee. Because discrimination on the basis of homosexuality or
transgender status requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employees
differently because of their sex, an employer who intentionally penalizes an employee for
being homosexual or transgender also violates Title VII. There is no escaping the role
intent plays: Just as sex is necessarily a but-for cause when an employer discriminates
against homosexual or transgender employees, an employer who discriminates on these
grounds inescapably intends to rely on sex in its decisionmaking (p. 2).
The employers do not dispute that they fired their employees for being homosexual or
transgender. Rather, they contend that even intentional discrimination against employees
based on their homosexual or transgender status is not a basis for Title VII liability. But
their statutory text arguments have already been rejected by this Court’s precedents. And
none of their other contentions about what they think the law was meant to do, or
should do, allow for ignoring the law as it is (p. 3).
An employer who discriminates against homosexual or transgender employees necessarily
and intentionally applies sex-based rules. Nor does it make a difference that an employer
could refuse to hire a gay or transgender individual without learning that person’s sex.
By intentionally setting out a rule that makes hiring turn on sex, the employer violates the
law, whatever he might know or not know about individual applicants. The employers
also stress that homosexuality and transgender status are distinct concepts from sex, and
that if Congress wanted to address these matters in Title VII, it would have referenced
them specifically. But when Congress chooses not to include any exceptions to a broad
rule, this Court applies the broad rule. Finally, the employers suggest that because the
policies at issue have the same adverse consequences for men and women, a stricter
causation test should apply. That argument unavoidably comes down to a suggestion that
sex must be the sole or primary cause of an adverse employment action under Title VII,
a suggestion at odds with the statute (pp. 3–4).
There is no way for [any job] applicant to decide whether to check the homosexual or
transgender box without considering sex. To see why, imagine an applicant doesn’t know
what the words homosexual or transgender mean. Then try writing out instructions for
who should check the box without using the words man, woman, or sex (or some
synonym). It can’t be done. Likewise, there is no way an employer can discriminate
against those who check the homosexual or transgender box without discriminating in
part because of an applicant’s sex. By discriminating against homosexuals, the employer
intentionally penalizes men for being attracted to men and women for being attracted to
women. By discriminating against transgender persons, the employer unavoidably
discriminates against persons with one sex identified at birth and another today. Any way
you slice it, the employer intentionally refuses to hire applicants in part because of the
affected individuals’ sex, even if it never learns any applicant’s sex (pp. 18–19).
Because homosexuality and transgender status can’t be found on that list and because they
are conceptually distinct from sex, the employers reason, they are implicitly excluded from
Title VII’s reach (p. 19).

most fundamental ways public administrators can promote an equitable culture is by
using inclusive language. Language is essential in constructing identity, particularly
LGBTQ þ identity that is new to the collective consciousness and continuously evolving
(Elias, 2020). Revising workplace policy, conducting training post-Bostock, and focusing
on enforcement is a starting point for building equitable environments for
LGBTQ þ and other employees.
As a first step toward a more inclusive organizational culture, public agencies should
closely examine their workplace policies, particularly human resources management policies. Many public agencies do not have stand-alone gender policies, vague gender policy is often part of a larger “diversity and inclusion policy,” but after Bostock, agencies
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should have an explicit, stand-alone gender policy. Such policy should include inclusive
language throughout the policy that prohibits harassment and discrimination (i.e.,
emphasis on additions of sexual orientation and gender identity post-Bostock), a detailed
process for employee transitions, clear sex-based job assignment details if applicable,
and explicit restroom and locker room use guidance.
Most agencies have not taken proactive steps to consider and develop a transition plan.
In the absence of a comprehensive transgender and other gender non-conforming
employee policy, agencies are unprepared for an individual to transition in the workplace
(Elias, 2017). Post-Bostock, agencies should better prepare for transitions by assigning a
designated point of contact, so employees who want to transition in the workplace know
where to go to begin the process or find answers to their questions about workplace transitions. Additionally, a standard set of practices should be made clear along with a comprehensive list of records that need to be changed after a transition takes place. Having a
comprehensive transgender and other gender non-conforming employee policy does not
entail rigidity in practice; rather, the policy should give the transitioning employee the
opportunity to develop the transition plan along with the agency’s transition team or representative (Elias, 2017). The policy should make clear that it is up to the transgender
employee to decide when, with whom, and how much to share private information. For
example, the U.S. Postal Service has created a “standard talk” for managers to use when
informing employees that a coworker is transitioning (Elias, 2017).
There are several benefits to individual employees and organizations from instituting
a transgender-specific employee policy post-Bostock. Specifically, a formal policy provides the following: It gives transgender employees a sense of security; transgender
employees, supervisors, and coworkers will know the protocol to follow when an
employee transitions in the workplace; it encourages supervisors and coworkers to be
comfortable with a workplace transition; it educates supervisors and coworkers about
what to expect when someone transitions in the workplace; and it shows official support
and structure for workplace transitions instead of transitions being handled on an ad
hoc basis (Elias, 2017). The policy should serve as a tool to implement Bostock and
inform transgender employees of their rights. In addition, the policy should educate cisgender employees on how to work appropriately within the agency’s gender policy.
Beyond transitions in the workplace, restroom and locker room usage policy should
be a central component of gender policy in all public workplaces. From Bostock and
Lusardi v. Department of the Army (2015), in which the EEOC found that when an
individual has transitioned to the gender that reflects his or her gender identity, denial
of equal access to the restroom that corresponds with the individual’s gender identity is
discrimination under Title VII (Elias, 2017). Lusardi and Bostock make clear that an
employer cannot condition an employee’s access to a particular restroom based on their
sex assigned at birth or the employee undergoing any particular medical procedure.
Finally, policy should be clear that supervisory or coworker confusion or anxiety does
not justify discriminatory terms and conditions of employment, including denial of
access to particular restrooms or locker rooms. Title VII prohibits discrimination based
on sex whether motivated by hostility, by a desire to protect people of a certain gender,
by gender stereotypes, or by the desire to accommodate other people’s prejudices or
discomfort (Elias, 2017). Workplace gender policy should state clearly that employees
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shall have access to restrooms and locker rooms corresponding to their current gender
identity and that at no time will the agency require a transgender employee to have
undergone any particular medical procedure, or provide proof that the employee underwent any medical procedure to have access to a restroom or locker room.
Furthermore, once policy is revised to include Bostock protections, all employees at
all levels of the organization should be trained on the legal and ethical dimensions of
LGBTQ þ equity in the workplace. These trainings should be appropriate for the rank
and position of the individual employees within the organization. As Federman and
Elias (2017) suggest, for training to be meaningful and have a significant impact on the
organizational culture, it should go beyond the basic legal protections. In addition,
training should focus on the ethical rationale for equity and inclusion as well as the
practical components of how to support transitioning coworkers, how to report gender
harassment, and how to act as an ally in the workplace. The format of training matters,
it should be participant-centered and encourage thoughtful consideration of the complexities of gender in the workplace.
Finally, enforcement is critical to ensuring Bostock does not become a hollow win for
LGBTQ þ individuals who may encounter workplace discrimination. Writing nearly two
months after the Bostock decision was issued, Sosin (2020) explains that “The
Department of Justice traditionally enforces new laws by issuing non-binding guidance,
aimed at alerting the public and other agencies to their rights and responsibilities …
But so far, the DOJ has not withdrawn old guidance no longer in compliance with the
law and issued a new one” (p. 1). Under the Trump administration, with a track record
of hostility toward the LBGTQ þ community, enforcement of Bostock remains questionable. Beyond the practical considerations of revising workplace policy, training, and
enforcement, Bostock prompts a number of theoretical considerations for expanding
and addressing identity and equity.

Implications for theory
Queer theory and intersectionality theory can help understand and parse the Bostock
ruling. However, before delving into this discussion, we offer two points of caution.
First, we acknowledge different scholarly perspectives on what theories are and what
they should be. Theories are often referred to as ways to make sense of the world, especially through providing answers to the question “Why does something work the way
that it does?” Based upon one’s philosophy of science—such as positivism, relativism,
pragmatism, or realism—it is debatable: (a) whether (and how) theories can (and
should) represent the world; (b) if theories can be objective (if there is such a thing)
and the degree to which they are products of social construction; (c) what counts as evidence; and (d) whether empirical, truly objective observations of phenomena are possible. Second, if theories are ways of making sense of the world, then they can and do
change to reflect changes in understandings of the world. Social theories, for instance,
can and do change as social conditions change (Van de Ven, 2007). So, in the case of a
major SCOTUS ruling, it will take time to understand how the Bostock ruling will
change attitudes of people, groups, and workplace dynamics and the theories that
describe and explain the interactions between these dimensions.
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We provide these points of caution, because we acknowledge that there are numerous
theories—both inside and outside of public administration—one could choose from to
examine the Bostock ruling. We chose to emphasize queer theory and intersectionality
theory not only because of the nature of the subject matter of Bostock (i.e.,
LGBTQ þ rights) but also because these theories remind us of the potential of existing
power structures to condition and define the meaning and effects of the ruling in
numerous ways.
As explained below, we are cautiously optimistic that Bostock pushes the equity needle for both theory and practice. The ruling provides greater legal recognition of identities heretofore unrecognized, and it could create safe, more diverse, and more
inclusive workplaces. Still, the theories help raise questions and concerns, especially
whether LGBTQ þ identities are now to be given “honorary status” to “fit into the
norm,” which are assimilationist goals that these theories’ proponents reject.
Representation of LGBTQ þ individuals in public agencies may improve, but culture
changes within those agencies will take much longer. Fundamental shifts in power in
the public sector have yet to take place, and even with legal recognition, social constructions of identities remain in place and will likely affect multiple decisions—hiring,
evaluations, promotions, and terminations—in subtler ways than before. What is
required is to advance the Bostock ruling with anti-racist, anti-white supremacist, and
anti-patriarchal changes to workplaces and society.
Queer theory
Queer theory is a type of critical theory that prompts examining how sex, gender,
sexual orientation, and gender identity are socially constructed. Rooted in understandings of how “attitudes, behaviors, and pervasive and systematic social arrangements”
exploit and subordinate groups (Bohmer & Briggs, 1991), queer theory notes that
homophobia, transphobia, cis-genderism, and dominant notions of sex and gender
are hierarchical, exclusionary, and violent tools to persecute those with
LGBTQ þ identities (Sedgwick, 2008). Further, queer theorists posit that identities
themselves are not natural (i.e., they are not “givens” but are constructed), are performative, and are not inherently stable (but they are stable to the degree to which
they become repetitive behaviors). Queer theorists encourage visibility of identity and
nonconformity and critique notions that there are “normal” and “abnormal” identities
(Dwyer, 2020; Taylor, 2013).
Using queer theory (and especially acknowledging its roots in post-structuralist and
deconstructionist philosophical approaches), cautious optimism regarding the Bostock
ruling might be warranted. Queer theory reminds us to query structured models of language, especially the claim that language is reflective of an objective reality. According
to queer theory, there is not an “objective” reality pointed to by language; rather, language’s representations of the world are socially constructed and dependent upon power
dynamics. Thus, whenever presented with simple binary structures of identity, especially
when such binaries are pitted against one another, we should be cautious, including
regarding issues of how such dimensions manifest themselves in public administration
(Dwyer, 2020; Lee et al., 2008).
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These binaries are at the basis of the Bostock ruling. The ruling is grounded in an
understanding of “sex,” especially as rooted in biological understandings of “sex” present in statutes (Title VII) and case law. In the majority opinion, the following is noted:
“The parties concede that the term ‘sex’ in 1964 referred to the biological distinctions
between male and female” (p. 2). Later, the following is noted: “An employer who discriminates against homosexual or transgender employees necessarily and intentionally
applies sex-based rules” (p. 3). From a legal perspective, this focus on sex is logical
given the following noted in the ruling: “Title VII makes it ‘unlawful … for an
employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual … because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin’” (p. 1).
While these notions are logical from a legal position given the need of the Courts to
consider the question before it as related to Title VII discrimination, we can critique
the gendered notions of self—especially simple binaries of “male vs. female” or “straight
vs. gay”—reflected in the ruling. While definitions of biological sex are at the heart of
the ruling of the case, “sex” is implicitly cis-gendered, heteronormative, homophobic,
and transphobic, and language about sexual orientation and gender identity reflect
dichotomous language choices in which one “preferred” and “normal” category is contrasted with “un-preferred” and “abnormal” categories. Thus, the Bostock ruling is based
upon a social construction that queer theorists argue is privileged, not objectively valid,
not fixed, and changed through discourse. Sex categorizations are not objective, valid
representations of reality but, rather, are social constructions in which one privileged
group (i.e., male) is pitted against and dominant over another group (i.e., female). Such
constructions fail to acknowledge identities beyond male-female binaries (Elias &
Colvin, 2020).
Thus, the Bostock ruling, from a queer theory perspective, could perpetuate existing
power structures and identity views that ultimately “privilege the privileged” in that
an understanding of equity is grounded in questionable ideas of biological sex.
SCOTUS’s ruling could represent the assimilationism that queer theorists warn
against, namely defining categories and defining “new normals” in terms of existing,
privileged power dynamics, in this case especially about biological definitions of “sex.”
The ruling does nothing to challenge essentialist notions of identity. Still, queer theory suggests we need to consider subtler ideas not just of sex but of the nature of
gender and gender identity as performative acts, not essentialist qualities. Queer theory suggests that we must continue not only to querry the decision itself but also to
queer the decision (see Lee et al., 2008). That is, we need to understand not only
what the ruling changes about workplaces but, perhaps even more fundamentally,
what it states about sexual orientation and gender identity in public service workplaces, particular this point: Sex-based binaries and protections rooted solely in such
binaries fail to acknowledge the full complexity of human identity and that workplaces protections rooted in false binaries, even that provide positive interim effects
regarding workplace protections, have further work to do to dismantle such binaries,
which are ultimately rooted in unjust power structures normalizing cis-gendered, heterosexual, and male-centered perspectives.
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Intersectionality theory
Relatedly, theories of intersectionality and related theories like black feminism and
queer black feminism build upon and add new dimensions to queer theory (Crenshaw,
1989; Lourde, 2017). Intersectionality theory notes how people are never just one identity—multiple statuses can and do combine in every person, and it is possible to articulate the privileges and injustices one receives based upon the combination of statuses,
especially race, color, gender identity, sexual orientation, and more (Blessett, 2020; Gaynor
& Blessett, 2014). The experiences of someone identifying as a white, cis-gendered male
will be vastly different even from a white, cis-gendered female. Compare and contrast these
experiences with the experiences of, say, a black, transgender female, who will experience
marginalization based upon prejudice against all of these identities individually and all of
them in tandem. The experiences of one person even among these overlaps will differ
enormously, especially when encountering public services, thus suggesting ethical needs for
public administration to consider subtler, more diverse, and more inclusive notions of
identity (De Vries, 2012; McCandless, 2018; McCandless & Ronquillo, 2020).
These theories emphasize the extent to which social constructions are ever-present in
societies, and they can and do affect everything from personal internalization of identities, relations between people, and power dynamics, especially when encountering the
public sector. These theories remind that socially constructed identities—especially in
terms of race, gender and gender identity, sexual orientation, class, and more—are laden
with narratives that privilege white, cis-gendered, male identifying perspectives, thus
leading to systems that are racist, white supremacist, and patriarchal (Alkadry &
Blessett, 2010). Further, these theories critique white feminism and white-centered queer
theories for excluding racial experience both within so-called traditional structures of
power but also within queer liberatory movements. Thus, LGBTQ þ liberation must
have intersectional dimensions (Daum 2020; De Vries, 2012; Murib, 2020).
Societal relations become ones of dominance and enslavement in which many outside
of privileged identities are made under-privileged through the entrenched power structures that create and enforce fundamental differences in positions people and groups
occupy. In short, systems of domination will privilege the privileged, and everything
about them are meant to continue this dominance (Lourde, 2017).
The need to examine the Bostock ruling through intersectional lenses is evident in
that the rulings centers on “sex” and through “sex,” allegedly, sexual orientation and
gender identity. “Race” is referenced in the decision most often through the language of
Title VII and in language like the following in the majority opinion: “By intentionally
setting out a rule that makes hiring turn on race or religion, the employer violates the
law, whatever he might know or not know about individual applicants” (p. 18). “Race”
also is referenced in Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent when referring to an amicus brief supporting the plaintiff, which notes how the case of Brown v. Board of Education was
ruled on “as a matter of original public meaning,” one of which concerned “equal
protection” in which “[t]he Court determined that black Americans—like all
Americans—have an individual equal protection right against state discrimination on
the basis of race” (p. 24). Further, “race” features in Justice Alito’s dissent to emphasize
how race is explicitly mentioned and intended by anti-discrimination legislation and
court cases (see pp. 20–21).

ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY & PRAXIS

11

Of course, from a basic legal perspective, distinguishing between categories of race
and sex, especially regarding discrimination, “makes sense” because the Court must consider the question at hand and the language of applicable statutes and precedent. Yet,
taking a broader view informed by intersectionality theory, it is possible to see how limited such a view is and that societal and legal understandings of race, sex, gender identity, and more must be subtler. Intersectionalities can and do manifest in workplace
dynamics in ways that go beyond cis-gendered, white, gay male identities (which were,
in reality, central to the case). Workplaces, especially in the public sector, have a long
way to go to protect people in any historically marginalized group. We must understand
the unique, lived experiences of people and how they can do and do differ. In workplace dynamics especially, we need to understand all of these dimensions, yet public
administration struggles with considering let alone understanding intersectionalities.
Additionally, anyone identifying outside of simple gender binaries not captured by simple (cis)male-(cis)female identities will face unique issues (Elias & Colvin, 2020;
McCandless, 2018). Within any workplace, even in the public sector, dynamics of
racism, genderism, cis-genderism, white supremacy, patriarchy, and more manifest in
and affect workplaces everyday (Breslin et al., 2017; Nelson & Piatak, 2019; Smith et al.,
2020), so it is reasonable to be cautious about the effects of Bostock. Race is and will
remain a nervous area of government, and without querying the causes and effects of
racial injustices and recognizing that such injustices undergird all aspects of public sector work (Gooden, 2014), the effects of even positive rulings like Bostock may
remain limited.
Further, inequitable workplace dynamics are themselves microcosms of societal
dynamics. While we write this essay, the dynamics of societal prejudices are fully on
display. Several persons have noted that we are currently living in a “double pandemic”
of COVID-19 and racism (see Gooden, 2020 for one example). Obviously, the inequities
of COVID-19 and racism overlap. As COVID-19 has demonstrated the limitations of
“honorary statutes” given to so-called “model minorities” (Zavattaro & McCandless,
2020) In the United States, Asian Americans were often seen as “the model group”
(Nguyen, 2020). Yet as COVID-19 was called terms like “a Chinese virus” or the “fault
of Asian people,” we see this honorary status revoked, harkening to the realities of how
U.S. society is deeply racialized and run for the benefit of cis-gendered white persons,
especially men (Kambhampaty & Sakaguchi, 2020). Recent police killings of Black persons are manifestations of centuries of persecution against Black, Indigenous, and
People of Color. Protests against these killings are often meant to highlight how deeply
inequitable and unjust structures run throughout U.S. society (Heaney, 2020). All of
these realities can and do manifest in public sector workplaces, ranging from inequitable
policies to aggressions and microaggressions at all levels (Heckler, 2017).

The Future of LGBTQ1 Protections Post-Bostock
In Bostock, the Court makes clear that sex discrimination under Title VII applies to
LGBT employees. The majority opinion in this case highlights the complexities of
addressing gender in the workplace, where the multiple, and at times competing, layers
of one’s identity coupled with the workplace norms, culture, and policy, make gender in
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the workplace incredibly challenging to reconcile. For public administration theory and
practice, the question becomes how can we be inclusive and embrace expansive theories
of identity that do not fit neatly into traditional human resources boxes, while at the
same “getting something done” in administrative behavior terms. The Court makes an
effort to provide greater clarity and stronger protections for LGBT employees.
In this sense, the Bostock ruling is a positive step forward. Still, as is the case with
many SCOTUS rulings, we are likely to see numerous, more specific issues arise related
to the enforcement or lack of enforcement of the ruling. For one, as cautioned by
Gaynor and Blessett (2014) in their analysis of the 2012 Windsor ruling:
Although the LGBT community is far from advantaged, those leading the cause are
oftentimes white men who can choose when to “reveal” their disadvantaged status, a
privilege not available to people of color. When and where they choose not to make this
revelation, they operate according to the privileges afforded white men in heteronormative
American society. The ability to navigate society in an advantaged group gives the white
men (and women) at the forefront of the movement power and relevance. (p. 265)

Thus, the potential for landmark rulings like Windsor, Obergefell, and Bostock are to
make advancements in one area while doing little, if anything, to improve the circumstances of black persons, indigenous persons, and persons of color who also identify as
LGBTQþ. In other words, even positives such as greater LGBTQ þ freedoms can and
are still couched in language of racism and white supremacy. Thus, “it is a fact that
white privilege affords these individuals the discretion to reveal or not reveal their
member- ship in a disadvantaged group. However, ethnic and racial minorities, due to
their complexion, are immediately associated with historical social constructs that suggest inferiority” (Gaynor & Blessett, 2014, p. 265).
In terms of implications for praxis, we do not yet know how the ruling will affect
workplace dynamics and if it will help lead to substantive improvements for the safety of
LGBTQ þ employees, especially given reluctance by the Trump administration to enact
protections established in Bostock (Sosin, 2020). Further, theories suggest an even further
need for caution, especially considering how the ruling is grounded in static, assimilationist understandings of “sex” and how the ruling does little to acknowledge the realities
of intersectional prejudice. As is often the case with legal advancements—whether in
terms of abolishing slavery, or extending enfranchisement, or offering workplace protections—the potential is there for discrimination to move from being more overt to being
more covert. Public institutions in particular—whether executive agencies, courts, or
legislatures—will need to be on their guard to look ever more sub rosa to understand
and root out the dynamics and durabilities of prejudice. Thus, cautious optimism is warranted for the continued advancement and expansion of acceptance of and workplace
safety for LGBTQ þ persons.
In order to further solidify these protections, we should think beyond Bostock and
the case law that got us to Bostock. Federal legislation is needed to make
LGBTQ þ protections widespread and permanent. The U.S. Congress has already done
significant work in making these goals a reality. For instance, the Equality Act, 116th
Congress: H.R. 5, S. 788, was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives in 2019
and would provide “consistent and explicit nondiscrimination protections for LGBTQ
people across key areas of life, including employment, housing, credit, education, public
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spaces and services, federally funded programs, and jury service” (Human Rights
Campaign [HRC], 2020). This legislation would amend existing civil rights and employment law, particularly the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fair Housing Act, the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, the Jury Selection and Services Act, and other legislation dealing with federal government employment to explicitly include sexual orientation and
gender identity as protected identity categories. The Act passed the House in a bipartisan vote of 236-173 and as of May 20, 2019 was read twice and referred to the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary (United States Congress, 2020). This progress coupled with
Bostock shows a shift in public opinion in favor of establishing LGBTQ þ equal rights.
The Act has broad support across political parties, states, sectors, and professional associations (HRC, 2020). Looking ahead in 2020, ideal steps forward would include the full
enforcement of the Bostock decision, adopting workplace policies that go beyond nondiscrimination to promote greater LGBTQ þ inclusion, and finally, passing the Equality
Act. These are no small tasks, but as the highest purpose of public service is to improve
quality of life, there is no time like the present to continue progress toward LGBTQþ
equity.

Note
1. Throughout this piece, we use both “LGBT” and “LGBTQþ”. We use the former when
referring to specific policies or cases that adopt the “LGBT” acronym. When telescoping to
the future, we use “LGBTQþ” to extend these identities and highlight broader implications.
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